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The relationship between international and national law has traditionally been characterised from a monist or dualist perspective. While this characterisation remains contested, the approach a country adopts has great significance for the effectiveness and application of international law within the domestic legal system. This paper examines current developments in Africa through various regional organisations, judicial decisions and constitutional provisions aimed at making international law supreme over and directly or automatically applicable in the national legal system. Developments within the East African Community, the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa and, the African Economic Community are discussed in this paper. It is suggested that these developments: challenge over traditional understandings of sovereignty, raise questions of democratic governance at the national and international level, may have reformative implications for the legal systems engaged, and generally hold greater prospects for the enforcement and effectiveness of international law. 

I INTRODUCTION
Africa is becoming more “international law-friendly”​[1]​; the initial hostility or ambivalence of the post-colonial towards international law​[2]​ is giving way to increased participation in international law processes, both in terms of institutional participation and in the development of norms.​[3]​ Indeed, it has been suggested that an “African international law” has emerged.​[4]​ More remarkable for our present purpose, and arguably a characteristic of this new African international law, is a trend in Africa towards making international law supreme over and directly or automatically applicable within the domestic legal system. While this may not in theory be radical in civil law countries, for common law countries in Africa, it is, both from a theoretical and practical perspective. Common law countries, unlike their monist civilian counterparts, often adopt a dualist approach to the relationship between international law and national law especially, as regards treaties. This trend of accepting the supremacy and direct application of international law has been complemented by judicial reliance on unincorporated treaties and decisions of international tribunals in adjudication. It is suggested in this paper that this trend represents a re-thinking of the relationship between international and national law and its full implications are yet to be explored.

Traditionally, two approaches to the reception of international law into the national legal system have been posited.​[5]​ Countries have been characterised as “monist” or “dualist.” Monists view international and national law as part of a single legal order. Thus, international law is directly applicable in the national legal orders. There is no need for any domestic implementing legislation; international law is immediately applicable within national legal systems. Indeed, to monists, international law is superior to national law.​[6]​ The dualists, on the other hand, view international and national law as distinct legal orders. For international law to be applicable in the national legal order, it must be received through domestic legislative measures, the effect of which is to transform the international rule into a national one. It is only after such transformation that individuals within the state may benefit from or rely on the international (now national) law. To the dualist, international law could not claim supremacy within the domestic legal system although it was supreme in the international law legal system.​[7]​

While the monist/dualist debate continues to shape academic discourse and judicial decisions, it is unsatisfactory in many respects. The debate focuses more on the source or pedigree of norms, and ignores the substance of the norms at issue. By creating a dichotomy between norms on the basis of their source, we risk being blinded from assessing the merits of the contents of the norms at issue. International and national law have traditionally addressed relatively different issues, the former concentrating on the relationships among states, and the latter relationships among persons within its jurisdiction. In recent times, however, it cannot be denied that there is gradual convergence of interest, and the ultimate goal of both is to secure the well-being of individuals. Areas where this common goal manifests itself include human rights law, environmental law, and commercial law; areas where there is increasing interaction between the national and international. Thus, international and national law share a lot in common and an attempt to compartmentalise or isolate them will be analytically flawed and practically inapposite at present.

The theoretical problems with the monist/dualist paradigm aside, the relationship between international law and national law has important practical implications for both systems and their subjects. It determines the extent to which individuals can rely on international law for the vindication of their rights within the national legal system; this has implications for the effectiveness of international law, which generally lacks effective enforcement mechanisms. As Professor Shaw has noted “…it is precisely because of the inadequate enforcement facilities that lie at the disposal of international law that one must consider the relationship with municipal law as more than of marginal importance.”​[8]​ The relationship between the two systems may also determine the extent to which there is cross-fertilisation of norms generated in both systems. The extent to which international law can compel or induce reform in national law hinges on this relationship. The respect accorded a legal system is enhanced when it is able to influence normative developments in other legal systems.

Current writings on the subject in Africa have generally concentrated on national/constitutional provisions and judicial treatment of customary international law.​[9]​ These writings have, ordinarily, not gone beyond trying to demonstrate whether the practice in the relevant countries on the continent conforms to or departs from the monist/dualist paradigm. This paper seeks to build on these previous works by analysing certain regional arrangements and judicial approaches relevant to but often ignored in the discussion. The aim is not to situate these arrangements or approaches within or without the monist/dualist paradigm but to assess the practical significance of these arrangements for international law, national law, and their respective subjects. 

II INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: REGIONAL ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
From the perspective of the relationship between international and national law, significant developments are taking place within some regional economic arrangements and national legal systems in Africa. Some African countries have accepted the direct and automatic application of international law within their national legal systems. Others have, in defined areas, subjected their national legal systems to an international one. International law is also finding a place, hitherto unavailable, in domestic adjudication and national constitutions. Ironically, all these have largely gone unnoticed in the academic world. These developments have been propelled by economic, social, and political considerations. National legal systems have been responding to legal developments in other national legal systems and in international law. There is a growing evidence of this vertical and horizontal interaction between and among these legal systems. This part examines these developments, exposes their innovative aspects, and assesses their significance for Africa and the legal subjects affected.

(i) The East African Community
The Treaty of the East African Community [EAC Treaty],​[10]​ which entered into force in 2001, establishes a community consisting of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The objective of the community is to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the member states in the political, economic, social, and legal fields among others.​[11]​ The EAC Treaty envisages a customs union, a common market and ultimately, a political federation of the states involved.​[12]​ The achievement of these demands the transfer or surrender of some level of sovereignty to the community and its institutions.​[13]​ Strong institutions are a prerequisite for successful integration. Indeed, the absence of strong independent institutions to counter-balance political inertia to integration is a major reason for the slow pace of economic integration in Africa notwithstanding multiple initiatives towards economic integration. Accordingly, the EAC Treaty grants sovereignty to community institutions and organs and elevates community law above national laws. Article 8(4) of the treaty provides, “Community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty.”​[14]​ The treaty also establishes the East African Court of Justice.​[15]​ The decisions of this court “have precedence over decisions of national court on a similar matter.”​[16]​ The importance of these provisions partly lies in their recognition of the importance of the strong institutions for the success of economic integration and the willingness to provide for that.

Article 8(4) appears to be a reaction against two previous Kenyan judicial decisions, which rejected the subordination of national law to community law. In the case of Okunda v. Republic,​[17]​ the question of the supremacy of East African Community law over Kenyan law was in issue. Two persons were being prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act 1968 of the East African Community without the consent of the counsel for the community. Under section 8(1) of the Act, such consent was necessary. The question was whether the Attorney General of Kenya could institute that proceeding without such consent. Resolving this issue involved examining the relationship between the community law and section 26(8) of the Kenyan Constitution which provided that in the performance of his duty, the Attorney General shall not be subject to the “direction or control of any person.” Counsel for the community submitted that the conflict between the two provisions should be resolved in favour of community law. He argued that under the Treaty for East African Co-operation,​[18]​ the members undertook to take all steps within their power to pass legislation to give effect to the treaty, and to confer upon Acts of the community the force of law within their territory. Further, under article 4 of the treaty, the members were enjoined “to make every effort to plan and direct their policies with a view to creating favourable conditions for the development of the Common Market and the achievement of the aims of the Community.” In the view of counsel, by these provisions, member states agreed to “surrender part of their sovereignty.”​[19]​ 

The court found that nothing had been done by Kenya in breach of these obligations and that the laws of the community are, under the Kenyan Constitution, part of the laws of Kenya and in the event of conflict, are void to the extent of their inconsistency with the Constitution; the Constitution being the supreme law of the land. Although an appeal from this decision was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal for East Africa,​[20]​ the court, recognising that the case raised an issue of “fundamental importance,” held obiter that “the Kenyan Constitution is paramount and any law, whether it be of Kenya, of the Community or any other country which has been applied in Kenya, which is in conflict with the Constitution is void to the extent of the conflict.”​[21]​ In a previous case that also involved a conflict between community and Kenyan law, the court had affirmed the superiority of Kenyan law.​[22]​

Article 8(4) demonstrates a resolve, inspired by the potential economic benefits of successful integration, and possibly similar jurisprudence in European community law, on the part of these common law countries to subject their national legal order to the international legal order; in this case community law. This is a move that is unparalleled as far as the legal framework for other regional economic communities, and common law Africa are concerned. Although at common law, an incorporated treaty provision may take precedence over an inconsistent national law, this is only as regards a prior national law. It cannot claim supremacy over a subsequent inconsistent national law. Under article 8(4) of the EAC Treaty, community law is supreme whether it pre-dates or post-dates a contrary domestic law. This provision ties the hands of member state governments for they cannot legislate, even in the future, a law contrary to community law.​[23]​ It implies a restriction on national decision-making powers.

It is difficult to anticipate how national courts will react if a similar conflict arises between community law and the national law in the light of this new supremacy provision. Even more difficult is the question of what happens in the event of a clash between community law and national constitutional law.​[24]​ For example, in Kenya, although article 3 of the Proposed Constitution 2005​[25]​ listed the law of the East African Community as part of the laws of Kenya, it was expressly provided that it was only “to the extent that it is consistent with this Constitution”. Article 2 not only proclaimed the supremacy of the Kenyan Constitution but also provided that the validity or legality of the Constitution cannot be subject to challenge by or before any court or State organ. Arguably, this would have prevented national courts from declaring a provision of the Constitution invalid, vis-à-vis community law but would not have prevented the Court of Justice of the East African Community from doing so. In Tanzania, the legislation implementing the EAC Treaty​[26]​ does not purport to impose any such restriction. It gives the treaty “the force of law” within Tanzania and annexes the treaty to the Act without amending the supremacy clause.​[27]​ An Act of the community comes into force on the date of its publication in the official Gazette and does not need any implementing legislation,​[28]​ evidencing the direct effect of community law. Whether the courts will be prepared by virtue of this supremacy clause to hold that “even the most minor piece of technical Community legislation ranks above the most cherished constitutional norm”​[29]​ remains to be seen. What is certain is that the judiciary is aware of the existence and implications of this supremacy provision.​[30]​  

This initiative by the East African Community represents a great leap towards collective exercise of sovereignty-through an international institution- by the states concerned. It reveals an approach to regional economic governance worth emulating on the continent.​[31]​ Economic integration in Africa will be strengthened under the governance of strong institutions at the community level. The East African Community initiative also represents a significant advance in the status of international law. Even within the European Union where the principles of supremacy of community law and direct effect are accepted doctrines, they still have “the status of unwritten principles of law.”​[32]​ They do not have a place either in the EEC Treaty or its revisions, neither are they also reflected in the national constitutions of EU member states. They are however, undoubtedly part of accepted law within the EU.

(ii) The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa
The objective of the Treaty establishing the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA)​[33]​ is to harmonise the business laws in the Contracting States.​[34]​ This is to be done through the elaboration and adoption of simple modern common rules adapted to their economies. Currently, OHADA has a membership of sixteen states. Most of them are francophone states with the majority in the West African sub-region.​[35]​ Given the underdeveloped state of the commercial law regime in Africa, arguably a reflection and product of low level commercial activity, the willingness by these African governments to abandon their disparate national laws and adopt a unified one is a triumph for international law and cooperation on the continent. Unification of law ensures certainty. People transacting across national boundaries will be subject to the same substantive law, thus ensuring equality of legal treatment, and a potential reduction in transaction cost. If law is the cement of society, then it can also be argued that a people living under a unified system of law will feel more connected with one another hence an opportunity for social integration is provided by OHADA.
 
An examination of the treaty provides yet another evidence of the preparedness of African governments to re-think the relationship between international and national law by relinquishing a measure of sovereignty to promote economic development. Under the treaty, member states have given up some level of national sovereignty in order to establish a single cross-border regime of uniform business laws called Uniform Acts. As one writer has perceptively observed, “no one can deny that transfer of sovereignty occurs under OHADA.”​[36]​ Although it may be to early to assess the success of the OHADA initiative, it cannot be denied that the very existence of the initiative, and the number of Uniform Acts so far agreed upon is impressive. Among the Uniform Acts currently adopted are, Uniform Acts on General Commercial Law, Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups, Secured Transactions, Bankruptcy, Debt Collection Procedures, and Accounting Law.

The Uniform Acts “are directly applicable and overriding in the Contracting States notwithstanding any conflict they may give rise to in respect of previous or subsequent enactment of municipal laws.”​[37]​ These laws are automatically and immediately applicable within the national legal systems of each country. No national implementing legislation is necessary. It has been held by the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration [Common Court] established under the treaty​[38]​ that the Uniform Acts also abrogate national laws that are contrary to the OHADA laws.​[39]​ The Common Court is the final authority on the interpretation and enforcement of the Treaty, adopted Regulations and the Uniform Acts.​[40]​ Parties to the OHADA Treaty or the Council of Ministers may seek advisory opinion from the Common Court.​[41]​ The Common Court may also hear appeals on referral from national courts or directly by aggrieved individuals.​[42]​ The decisions of the court are final, conclusive and override those of all national courts including national Supreme Courts. This allows for the uniform interpretation and application of the Uniform Acts.

From the perspective of the constitutional arrangements in the OHADA member countries, the technique of direct applicability and supremacy of international law over domestic law may not be a radical departure from existing constitutional law. The majority of its members, who are former French colonies, have constitutional provisions modelled along article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958, which provides that “treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon their publication, have an authority superior to that of domestic legislation, subject, for each agreement or treaty, to application by the other party.”​[43]​ Although this article makes treaties superior to domestic legislation, there are conditions that must be satisfied for this to happen.​[44]​  First, the agreement has to be duly ratified or approved and published. Due ratification entails ensuring legislative, and sometimes judicial, intervention or participation before the treaty is ratified. This contrasts with the approach in common law jurisdiction where the executive negotiates and concludes treaties that must subsequently be approved by the legislature.​[45]​  The second requirement is that of reciprocity in the application of the treaty.​[46]​ It is as regards this second requirement that the implementation of the Uniform Acts in member states’ legal system departs from the constitutional model. The application of the Acts within the national legal systems of the member states is not founded on reciprocity.
 
The OHADA project represents a laudable effort at reforming the commercial laws of the states engaged. Indeed, it is a project that should be encouraged to potentially cover the whole of Africa.​[47]​ From the perspective of international law, the real test for OHADA will come when common law countries, with their traditional adherence to dualism, begin to join. Currently, countries such as Nigeria and Ghana are contemplating membership. Arguably, the supremacy and direct application clause may be one of the reasons why there is currently no common law member of OHADA.​[48]​ It will demand a reworking of existing constitutional provisions on the effect of treaties in national law before these common law countries can effectively participate in the work of OHADA.

(iii) The African Economic Community
The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community [AEC Treaty] represents another evidence of the preparedness of African governments to re-examine the relationship that exists between international and national law. The treaty envisages an economic community covering the whole of Africa. This will be achieved through defined stages including a free market, a customs union, and a common market. All of these entail the surrender of some level of sovereignty to the community. Under article 3(e) of the AEC Treaty, member states are enjoined to observe the legal system of the community. It is clear from this provision that the AEC has been constituted as a legal system distinct from those of the member states. As positivist legal theorists have demonstrated, the presence of an ultimate authority whose norms directly binds the subjects of the system, and cannot be contradicted or subordinated either by them or any other external source is an essential characteristic of a legal system.​[49]​ Arguably, by constituting the AEC as a legal system, the member states have conferred on it this characteristic; a characteristic whose effect on the relationship between the national legal systems of the AEC member states and the AEC’s legal system remains to be seen. The experience of Europe,​[50]​ in terms of the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy of community law, demonstrates that the affirmation of the AEC as a legal system has serious implication for the operation of community law within national legal systems. It will subject the legal systems of the member states to the norms of the community legal system in areas within the competence of the community. 

Under the AEC Treaty, community law may apply automatically within national legal systems. Article 10 provides that, decisions of the Assembly are “automatically enforceable” thirty days after being signed by the Chairman of the Assembly. Under article 13, Regulations of the Council of Ministers, which must be approved by the Assembly, are also “automatically enforceable” thirty days after signature by the Chairman of the Council. This suggests the direct application of Assembly decisions and Council Regulations in member states. They will not be subjected, especially in dualist countries, to any further national implementation measure before the courts, and private parties can rely on them in litigation. 

Whilst the automatic enforceability of community law within the national legal system of the member states is explicit, that cannot be said of the question of supremacy of community law. In this regard, the approach of the AEC Treaty contrasts sharply with the other regional arrangements noted in this paper, which are very explicit of the question of supremacy. The silence of the AEC Treaty imitates a similar silence on this issue in the Treaty of the European Economic Community. I have argued elsewhere that the supremacy of community law can be inferred from the text and purpose of the AEC Treaty.​[51]​ In arguing thus, I borrowed from the jurisprudence and interpretive approach of the European Court of Justice when faced with a similar question on the supremacy of EC law within the legal systems of the member states.​[52]​ The fact that the AEC Treaty constitute the community as a legal system and obliges them to observe this legal system; that article 5 of the treaty enjoins member states to refrain from unilateral activities that will hinder the attainment of the objectives of the community; that decisions and regulations of the community are automatically enforceable in member states; that conflicting national laws may hinder the realisation of the objectives of the community; that the community espouses the division of competence between itself and the members; and that the treaty requires the harmonisation of policies, can all form the basis for my inferring the supremacy of community law under the AEC Treaty. If the Court of Justice of the African Union​[53]​ ultimately accepts these arguments, the AEC will become the ultimate evidence of a trend towards supranationalism in Africa. It will be evidence that member states have surrendered part of their sovereignty for the effective operation of this continentwide economic integration initiative.

(iv) International Law and National Courts
(a) Reliance on unincorporated treaties
It is a fundamental principle of the common law that a treaty does not have the force of law within the national legal system unless implemented by domestic legislation.​[54]​ This principle has the doctrine of the separation of executive and legislative powers at its foundation. In recent times however, some national courts in Africa have demonstrated a willingness to rely on international human rights conventions in adjudication, even when they have not been incorporated into the national legal system. In Unity Dow v. Attorney General,​[55]​ the court’s interpretation of the relevant legislation was “strengthened” by the fact that Botswana was a signatory to the OAU Convention on Non-Discrimination even though Botswana had not ratified it, a fact that the judge expressly acknowledged. The court also cited the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1967) in reaching its decision. On appeal the Attorney General specifically took issue with the use of unincorporated treaties by the trial court. The Court of Appeal, however, affirmed the High Court’s reliance on these international instruments.​[56]​ With words which seem to cast doubt on the thinking that unincorporated treaties do not confer rights on individuals, Amissah JA held “even if it is accepted that those treaties and conventions do not confer enforceable rights on individuals within the state until parliament has legislated its provisions of the law,”​[57]​ [emphasis added] they could be used as aids to construction. Similarly, in the Ghanaian case of New Patriotic Party v. Inspector General of Police,​[58]​ Archer CJ held that the fact that Ghana had not passed specific legislation to give effect to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights did not mean it could not be relied upon.​[59]​ In the Nigerian case of Abacha v. Fawehinmi,​[60]​ the Supreme Court accepted that an unincorporated treaty might give rise to a legitimate expectation by citizens that the government, in its act affecting them, would observe the terms of the treaty.​[61]​ The jurisprudence on the doctrine of legitimate expectation shows that it significantly relaxes the rule that an unincorporated treaty cannot confer rights or impose duties in domestic law.​[62]​

These decisions are remarkable; coming from common law jurisdictions where treaties do not, ordinarily, have any effect unless they are incorporated into national law. They reveal preparedness on the part of the court to go beyond the traditional use of unincorporated treaties as aids to interpretation.​[63]​ The courts appear to be suggesting that unincorporated treaties may create enforceable rights in national law. The cases attach national significance to the international act of ratifying treaties.

Unlike other African countries noted below, there are also no explicit provisions in the constitutions of these countries that allow the courts to rely on international law in adjudication. Thus, it can be argued that this reliance on unincorporated treaties represents an assertion, by the judicial branch, of autonomy from both the legislature and the executive, who are responsible for treaties and their incorporation into national law. Indeed, the language of the Courts -“strengthened,” “relied upon,” and give rise to “legitimate expectation”- gets stronger with each judgment. The scope of the language is broad and is pregnant with serious implications for the enforcement of international law in national courts.​[64]​ For example, the extension of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to “unincorporated treaties” represents a significantly broad interpretation of the categories of “promise or practice” which define the scope of application of the doctrine.​[65]​ Additionally, the doctrine of legitimate expectation has the potential to confer not only procedural but also, and more importantly, substantive benefits on litigants. Application of the doctrine limits the exercise of statutory discretion but raises difficult questions on the role of judges as law or policy makers. 

As governments become increasingly involved in international agreements, such as in the fields of contracts, financial regulation, trade, and transportation that are basically intended to regulate relationships between individuals, and significantly affect their actions,​[66]​ these decisions may come in handy for individuals. These decisions offer some hope for individuals in the face of a tendency on the part of governments to readily ratify international treaties but hesitate to incorporate them into national law. In Africa, this problem has partly been attributed to the absence of clear constitutional provisions addressing the issue.​[67]​ Another factor may be the domestic cost, in terms of resources needed, to secure compliance with obligations assumed under international treaties. These decisions signal to the executive that the ratifications of treaties are not mere platitudinous acts and that they may have significant national effects. It is possible that this may make the executive more circumspect in their ratification of treaties.

Reliance on unincorporated treaties involve an assertion of judicial autonomy that only exists in a very a limited degree in the application or use of customary international law in domestic adjudication. This is especially so in countries where there are no constitutional provisions making customary international law part of the national laws.​[68]​ From both the transformation or incorporation approaches, customary international law is applied only when they are, unlike an unincorporated treaty, part of the national law. An unincorporated treaty is never part of national law. Indeed, the fact of unincorporation may be a manifestation of parliamentary resistance to it. By giving effect to it absent a national implementing measure, the judiciary may be indirectly setting itself up against the will of an elected branch of government or upsetting the balance of power between the various organs of government.​[69]​ At another level, giving effect to unincorporated treaties indirectly allows the executive to change the law without any intervention from the legislature, which is the law-making body. This will unwittingly enhance, at the expense of the legislature, the powers of the executive by adding indirect law-making powers to its competence. As treaties become more important in domestic law, these power relation issues will become more prominent in Africa.

(b) Reference to decisions of international tribunals
Aside from relying on unincorporated treaties, some domestic courts have utilised decisions of international tribunals in adjudication.​[70]​ These tribunals include, the International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, European Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The use to which decisions from these international tribunals are put to ranges from mere reference to direct application. The jurisprudence the national courts rely on relates to both the existence and interpretation of existing international norms. As Bedjaoui suggests, this technique provides a means by which the “ramparts of State sovereignty is breached, thus enabling the norm or judicial decision to pass from the international legal order into the municipal legal order.”​[71]​ In this respect, it is significant that the international tribunal’s jurisprudence may be one in which the state in question has not consented to or in anyway participated in its formation. Indeed, decisions of international tribunals are, ordinarily, binding only on the parties to the litigation.​[72]​ Additionally, unlike the relationship between some international tribunals and domestic courts (for example between European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights and domestic courts of member states who are parties to the relevant treaty), there is no formal state-treaty mandated relationship between these African national courts and the international courts from which they are borrowing. Thus, this is once again a manifestation of independence or an “autonomous self conception”​[73]​ on the part of the judiciary. This conception may reflect a belief in a shared judicial goal of ensuring justice for all irrespective of the source from which the norm that will facilitate this goal emanates, and a desire, on the part of the national courts, to enhance their ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of the international community by acting as enforcers of international values.​[74]​ 

The trend of relying on decisions of international tribunals is evident from an examination of law reports in Africa.​[75]​ For example, between 2000 and August 2005 there are about fifty reported cases in which South African courts made use of decisions from various international tribunals.​[76]​ This user ranged from mere reference to direct application. One case made reference to two decisions of the African Human Rights Commission (which is not a court). A similar trend is revealed in the African Human Rights Law Reports.​[77]​ At a time when courts in countries such as the United States have been accused of being oblivious to international law and others questioned for their reliance on it,​[78]​ this judicial attitude in Africa may be lauded as a triumph for international law. I however, criticise the absence of reliance on decisions of international courts in Africa such as the COMESA Court of Justice, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Special Court for Sierra Leone, or even the African Commission which, although not a court, has been providing some instructive human rights jurisprudence.​[79]​ While the decided cases before these African international tribunals are relatively few, they exist, and their contribution to jurisprudence, and international law should be recognised and relied on, where appropriate, by other national courts in Africa.​[80]​
In some jurisdictions in Africa the reference to international decisions has constitutional foundation. Article 11(2) of the Malawi Constitution allows the courts to “have regard to current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case law” in interpreting the Constitution. Under article 39(1) of the South Africa Constitution, in interpreting the Bill of Rights, courts must consider international law and may consider foreign law. Article 233 also enjoins the courts to prefer interpretations that are consistent with international law. However, not all countries have showed a willingness to accept this new judicial attitude. For example, Section 111B of the Zimbabwe Constitution, inserted in 1993, provides that except as otherwise provided by this Constitution or by or under an Act of Parliament, any convention, treaty or agreement acceded to, concluded or executed by or under the authority of the President with one or more foreign states or governments or international organizations shall not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated into the law by or under an Act of Parliament. As Maluwa has suggested this provision was clearly aimed at preventing courts from invoking international law.​[81]​
(v) International Law and National Constitutions 
There is also a trend towards the adoption of “ international law-friendly” constitutions,​[82]​ among some African countries.​[83]​ Especially in Anglophone Africa, there seems to be a gradual abandonment of the practice of “avoiding the constitutional incorporation of international law altogether.”​[84]​ Article 144 of Constitution 1990 of Namibia can be said to represent the first manifestation of these international law friendly constitutions. Article 144 provides that “unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.” The 1992 Constitution of Cape Verde is more far reaching. Article 11 provides: 
“General or common international law, insofar as it is in force in the international legal order, shall be an integral part of the Capeverdean legal order… Legal acts emanated from the relevant organs of the supranational organizations of which Cape Verde is a member, shall enter directly into force in the domestic legal order, provided that that is so established in the respective constitutive instruments. The rules and principles of general or common international law and of conventional international law, validly approved or ratified, shall prevail after their entry into force in the international and domestic legal orders, over all legislative and domestic normative acts of an infra-constitutional value.”​[85]​ 
The 1993 Interim Constitution and currently article 39(1) and 233 of the 1996 South African Constitution provide yet another evidence of these international law friendly constitutions. It has been noted that, if the general rules of public international law in the Namibia Constitution is interpreted narrowly to exclude customary international law, then, the fact that the South African provision extends to the incorporation of customary international law makes it a first since no similar provision in other Constitutions in Africa exists.​[86]​ By specifying that customary law is part of the law of the country, it puts to an end the debate over whether customary law is part of the domestic law by virtue of incorporation or transformation. 

These provisions in the constitutions of Namibia and South Africa can be said to represent an acknowledgement of the special role international law played in the struggles for independence and against apartheid in these two countries.​[87]​ International law is seen as providing a neutral foundation for development a new legal order distinct from the old that was marked by apartheid. Reaching out to international law also serves as a means of becoming part of the global community after decades of isolation.

These constitutional provisions appear to be inspiring some common law countries, which traditionally have avoided such provisions.​[88]​ Malawi and Kenya are two such countries. Under article 211(3) of the Malawi Constitution of 1995 customary international law, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament is acknowledged to have continued application and is accordingly part of the laws of Malawi. In Kenya, article 3 of the Proposed Constitution 2005 listed customary law, international agreements applicable to Kenya, as well as the laws of the East African Community as part of the laws of Kenya. Although this proposed constitution was rejected, its provisions on international law represented another manifestation of Africa’s growing international law friendliness. It is hope that ultimate this provision will find its way into the Kenya constitution and that of other African countries.

The idea of international law-friendly constitutions in Africa should not be confined to the express inclusion of international law as part of national law. International law continues to influence the structure and workings of many national constitutions. One area this manifests itself is the incorporation of human rights and environmental law provisions into all the emerging constitutions on the continent.​[89]​  Human rights provisions inspired by various international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are now routinely incorporated into national constitutions in Africa. 

These constitutional provisions put courts on a surer foundation when using international law in domestic adjudication, both as an interpretive device and for the creation or conferment of substantive rights. Indeed, some of the constitutions specifically enjoin the judiciary to have regard to international law in adjudication. Under article 11(2)(c) of the Malawian Constitution of 1995 it is provided that in interpreting the provisions of this Constitution a court of law shall where applicable, have regard to current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case law. Arguably, foreign case law is not limited to foreign domestic cases but can be extended to international tribunals like the International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the African Union.​[90]​ Under article of the 39(1) South Africa Constitution of 1996 it is provided that in interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must consider international law and may consider foreign law. This provision significantly expands the reach of international law; it can be used not only by courts, but also tribunals, and other forums. Additionally, article 233 enjoins courts to prefer interpretations that are consistent with international law. These provisions represent a shift, especially in common law countries, from the situation where reliance on international law as an aid to interpretation did not have direct statutory or constitutional foundation but was the result of common law rules. 

These constitutional provisions also reflect the extent to which African countries are becoming open to and receptive of outside normative influences. Arguably, in this era of globalisation this is inevitable; what is revealing here, however, is that it is being explicitly acknowledge and fostered. Indeed, some writers have sought to find a link between democracy and the influence of international law in national legal systems. The belief is that respect for international law would arise as a natural corollary to the spread of democracy.​[91]​ However contested this linkage may be, it cannot be denied that international law is finding a niche, hitherto unavailable, within the national legal systems of Africa countries. In the next part we explore some of the implications of this evolving reality.

III RE-IMAGINING INTERNATIONAL LAW- SOME SELECTED ISSUES
The above examination provides empirical evidence of the changing attitudes towards the relationship between international and national law in Africa. International law is influencing and shaping national legal processes and decision-making in a manner hitherto unknown. The concept of sovereignty, which suggested that national legal systems are sealed or isolated from outside interference, is being re-assessed. The content of national legal rules also continues to be shaped by international law. Indeed, some have had to be abolished in response to the dictates of international law. This is occurring through the direct incorporation of international laws, such as in the area of human rights, into national constitutions, and indirectly through judicial decision-making, which takes account of international law. The interaction between the two legal orders is also raising questions of domestic power relations and the law-making processes at the international level. In this part we examine some of the issues that arise for the interaction between these two legal orders.

(i) Re-examination of traditional understanding of sovereignty 
The dualist conception of the domestic legal system as sealed from the outside world, made international norms not directly applicable in national legal systems. Under this conception, to allow the rules of international law to operate directly in municipal law unjustifiably concedes that international law is superior to, and detracts from the authority of municipal law.​[92]​ This was something a sovereign state, with its legal system, could not countenance. The above examination, however, reveals a shift in the traditional understanding of sovereignty as it relates to the relationship between the international and national legal systems. It represents a significant shift, even if in theory, on the part of countries that were once characterised as “reluctant to incorporate international law directly into their national constitutions and thereby make it an integral part of their municipal law.”​[93]​ 

Indeed, this re-examination of sovereignty is going on both in the legal and political realm. The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which was a cardinal principle of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), has become a relic of the past upon the coming into force of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.​[94]​ Under article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act member states recognise “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”​[95]​ Elsewhere in Africa in August 2003, members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)​[96]​ unanimously endorsed a Mutual Defense Pact that gives each nation the right to intervene in armed attacks on their member states.​[97]​ Although these two instruments are riddled with textual ambiguity, and remain to be tested in practise, the fact of an agreement on them represents a remarkable achievement in Africa.​[98]​ Indeed, as Yusuf notes, no other regional organisation in Africa has ever incorporated such a right in its constitutive instrument.​[99]​ Saddled with civil conflicts and human rights abuses that are often neglected by the international community, these African initiatives hold the potential of securing peace and respect for human rights on the continent. How far these new intervention policies will assist in the reduction of conflicts and promote human rights in Africa remains to be seen.​[100]​ If the recent AU experience with the Darfur situation in Sudan is anything to go by, then it can safely be said that the challenge is monumental. The presence of political will beyond the existence of a text mandating intervention, the receptiveness of the local population to the fact of intervention, and the availability of funding for that purpose are crucial if the positive impact of these new policies of intervention is to be realised.

The efforts at economic integration in Africa may also benefit from the integration of community law into domestic legal systems, and the concomitant surrender of sovereignty. As Forneris has noted, 
“…sovereignty transfer is a necessary attribute of any real integration process…. Without it regional groupings would amount to little more than a loose association of countries-no more than a club or forum where governments might engage in discussion on matters of common interest and might issue statements and non-binding recommendations only to rush into unilateral decisions that might end up being counter to the spirit if not the letter of the joint statements.”​[101]​
 Arguably, such has been the case of economic integration efforts in Africa. Economic integration in Africa has been characterised by weak institutional frameworks, the absence of political will, and minimal national impact. Experience in Europe indicates that as community laws become part of national law, and individuals begin to make claims founded on them, economic integration will deepen.

Re-examining our understanding of sovereignty, and how it impacts on the relationship between international and national law is important in this age of interdependency and globalisation. Sovereignty should not be viewed as a zero sum game; you either retain or lose it.​[102]​ Assertion of sovereignty should not lead a nation onto the path of legal isolationism. It may sometime be necessary to ‘lose’ sovereignty for the general benefit of all the participants in a common undertaking like an economic integration. The experience of the European Union demonstrates how individual states can give up a degree of sovereignty to the advantage of all in this regard.

(ii) Respect for international law
Perhaps no greater problem bedevils international law than the problem of enforcement or ensuring compliance with its norms. It is suggested that the changing attitude towards international law in Africa holds greater prospect for the enforcement of international law on the continent. The fact that international law is often not integrated into national legal systems poses a strong challenge to its effectiveness. National enforcement is an essential means of increasing respect for and effectiveness of international law. With the increased acceptance of international law by national courts, and the direct application of international law within national legal systems, private individuals may be able to make claims founded on it. This will enhance the effectiveness of international law.​[103]​ The extension of the doctrine of legitimate expectation by the courts to unincorporated treaties may afford substantive rights to individuals in litigation before national courts. By constitutionally making international law a part of domestic law, international law becomes a relevant consideration in decision-making. This implies, for example, that the exercise of judicial and administrative discretion should take account of international law, and arguably, produce an outcome that is consistent with international law. 

With the supremacy and automatic enforceability of community law, individuals may be able to challenge the validity of domestic legislation and measures that are not in conformity with the dictates of community law. Individuals will become enforcers of community law, and international law for that matter, through litigation before national courts. This layer of enforcement - individual and national courts - will complement the efforts of community enforcement institutions such as in the case of the AEC, the Court of Justice of the African Union. As Justice Powell once noted, “until international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of the various countries afford the best means for the development of a respected body of international law.”​[104]​ With international law as part of national law in some African countries, their national courts have become a forum for the vindication of rights acquired under international law, and a channel for securing the discharge by states of obligations assumed there under.

The effectiveness of international law in Africa can be greatly enhanced if individuals are allowed to rely on international law in domestic adjudication and have direct access to international tribunals in case of violation of international law. We have argued elsewhere how individuals can be a force behind the economic integration efforts in Africa if allowed to invoke community law before national courts, and also have direct access to community tribunals.​[105]​ Indeed, some economic communities in Africa provide a right of action before their respective community courts for individuals.​[106]​ Allowing for private right of action increases the number of persons who will potentially bring cases before international tribunals, and save states the trouble of litigating on behalf of their nationals. It performs the constitutional function of limiting the power of governments to decide which community laws are worth enforcing, thus guaranteeing greater governmental compliance with community law. Individuals will also be able to participate in the creation of community law through strategic litigation and legal submissions that will shape the jurisprudence of courts. All these will ensure greater compliance with community law.

The reliance on decisions of international tribunals by national courts will also strengthen the former by broadening the reach of their jurisprudence. The stature of a court partly depends on the recognition accorded its jurisprudence by other courts both within and without its jurisdiction. In this regard, it is hoped that national courts in Africa will begin to make use, where appropriate, of the jurisprudence of African international tribunals in adjudication.  This can be facilitated by regular interaction between international tribunals in Africa and their national counterparts, and the making of their jurisprudence readily available. The selection of international judges from the national courts may be an important first step in forging this relationship.

(iii) Reform of national legal rules
The interaction between international and national law also holds the potential for inspiring reform of aspects of national law. This is especially so in the area of human rights law, but it also remains true for others areas of law. An awareness of, and a reliance on international human rights law has led to reforms in many aspects of African customary law. The patriarchal and communal tendencies of customary law are coming under attack from the equalising and individualist teachings of human rights.​[107]​ But the impact of international law is being, and indeed must be, felt in other areas of law too.
 
The Ugandan case of Shah v Manurama Ltd.​[108]​ provides an example of how domestic civil procedure rules may be affected by international law commitments. In this case, the defendant brought an application seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to pay security for costs. The plaintiff was resident in Kenya, and thus outside the jurisdiction of the Uganda High Court. The defendant argued that the fact that the plaintiff was resident abroad was prima facie ground for ordering payment of costs. In so arguing, the defendant relied on well-established common law principles. In reply, the plaintiff argued that given the re-establishment of the East African Community, the question of residence for the purpose of ordering security for cost should be re-examined. In denying the application, the court held that in East Africa, there could no longer be an automatic and inflexible presumption for the courts to order security for cost with regard to a plaintiff who is resident in the East African Community. The court reasoned that the fact of East African Community residence “begs for a fresh re-evaluation of our judicial thinking” as regards the implementation of the law requiring plaintiffs to pay security for costs. Among the factors that influenced the court in declining the application were the facts that:​[109]​
“…. 
(2) All the three countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania are partner States in the East African Community (EAC). 
(3) The East African Community Treaty (like the European Community Treaty) seeks to establish a customs union, a common market and a monetary union – as integral pillars of the Community: and ultimately a political union among the partner states. In particular, the East African Community Treaty makes express provision for the unification and harmonization of the laws of the partner States, including “standardization of the judgments of courts within the Community”; and establishment of a common bar (that is cross-border legal practice) in the partner States….
(4) The underlying objective of undertaking all the initiatives described above- and may more not discussed in this ruling- are stated in article 5 of the East African Community Treaty as being the need: ‘to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the partner states in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit.’
…. 
(7) Article 104 of the East African Community Treaty provides for the free movement of persons, labour, services, and the right of establishment and residence. The partner States are under obligation to ensure the enjoyment of these rights by their citizens within the Community. In this regard, the court is mindful of the fact that the East African Community Treaty has the force of law in each partner State; and that this Treaty law has precedence over national law.”
This case demonstrates a clear appreciation on the part of the court of the importance of community law, and its impact on existing national laws. It is refreshing that individuals are beginning to enforce the benefits community law provides for them. This can be enhanced by promoting in individuals, lawyers, and judges an awareness of the existence, implications and benefits of community law. This is a task that should be vigorously pursued by the various economic communities in Africa. Hopefully, the engagement between community law, national courts and individuals will continue.

International law can also provide a basis for the development of the common law through legislation and judicial decisions.​[110]​ In this regard, it is significant that the South Africa Constitution enjoins the courts to develop the common law or customary law such as to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.​[111]​ When interpreting the Bill of Rights, the court must make use of international law. It is suggested that through this route, international law may be used to develop the common law. Where the common law is unclear or non-existent on an issue, international law could be used to clarify or develop it.  As Justice Brennan has noted, “the common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights.”​[112]​ It is not only international human rights that can be relevant for the development of the common law in Africa. International commercial law, as reflected in, for example, the work of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)​[113]​ could provide rules for the development of commercial law. For example, the work of UNCITRAL on payment systems, insolvency, and electronic commerce are areas that the common law may greatly benefit. This is especially so in the light of the highly underdeveloped state of these areas of the law in Africa. In recent times, a proposed Uniform Act of OHADA on contracts is being influenced by UNIDROIT principles of International Commercial Contracts.​[114]​ This development is refreshing if account is taken of the relatively underdeveloped state of the law in this area in Africa. The work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law​[115]​ can also shape the development of the common law rules on private international law;​[116]​ a subject whose development has been utterly neglected in Africa. Indeed, so under-developed is the subject in Africa that one writer has described it as ‘the Cinderella subject seldom studied [and] little understood.’​[117]​ The Hague Conventions on private international law can provide the basis for legislation in areas where the common law responses have proved inadequate, ineffective or unduly complicated such as in the areas of securities and child abduction.

The extent to which the works of these international law institutions can provide the basis for the development of national law is a function of the degree of state’s participation in their activities. Thus, we suggest that there is need for increased participation of African countries in the works of these forums. It is only by participation that the specific needs, and legal traditions of a country can be taken into account in the development of law by these institutions. Participation also creates a potentially supportive domestic constituency thus making for increased awareness of and easier implementation of laws developed in these forums. In an era of increased interdependency and legal interaction, Africa cannot afford to be oblivious to or isolated from developments in these international forums. Africa’s devotion to human rights law, as reflected in the incorporation of human rights provisions into national constitutions, and the proliferation of human rights NGOs on the continent, should be matched with similar attention to these equally important developments in other aspects of international law.

(iv) Democratic deficit
The above examination suggests that the elected branches of government, the executive and legislature appear to have surrendered part of state sovereignty to international institutions. Additionally, the unelected branch of government, that is the judiciary, has been asserting a level of autonomy as regards the role of international law in the national legal system. Furthermore, issues of representation and accountability appear not to have been wholly accounted for in these new arrangements for receiving international law. These raise questions of a potential democratic deficit at two levels. 

At the international level, one may query the propriety of entrusting ‘national law making powers’ to international institutions that are not directly accountable to the people who are often affected by the decisions. For example treaty making often takes place behind close doors with little outside input. As Daintith puts it “ international law is formed in an inherently non-democratic way…by conclaves of treaty negotiators collectively responsible to no representative body.”​[118]​ This non-democratic issue is exacerbated where the treaty regime creates supranational organisations like the EAC, AEC, and OHADA. Such supranational organisations have powers to take decision that are directly or automatically applicable within the national legal system. Their treaty regimes often preclude governments from taking certain decisions domestically on the pain of being in breach of their international commitments.

Admittedly, a more open, representative, and participatory process of international law making may mitigate these concerns.​[119]​ The problem, however, always is who gets represented and by whom. Various interests groups such as women, investors and traders are all significantly affected by international law. Ensuring a voice for them in the creation of international law represents a formidable challenge. The fact that these interests are often not represented, coupled with the increasing application of international law in the national legal system suggests that legislatures in Africa must strengthen their oversight responsibility as far as international law is concerned. Mechanisms, such as question times in parliament, and the use of the parliamentary committee system, should be put in place to ensure legislative involvement in the processes leading to the conclusion of international agreements.​[120]​ Establishing a specific parliamentary committee responsible for examining developments in international law, and their domestic significance or impact will not be out of place.​[121]​ The time when international law was conceived as impacting only on relationships between sovereigns is history, hence, the need for greater attention to ensure that its rules meet national needs and aspirations.

While the democratic question is important, it can be criticised for concentrating on the source of norms and ignoring their content. International law may indeed, and often do reflect national values. Even when they do not, international law can provide rules and a basis for the development of national law. Indeed, history is replete with instances where people have turned to international law “as a source of standards of fairness and humanity to supplement local traditions which may be tainted with bias, discrimination or faction.”​[122]​ South Africa provides an example of this. To merely dismiss a rule of law on account of its source will be unfortunate. Substance should overcome form in this regard.  The presence of well laid out conditions for allowing international law to have direct effect within the national legal system, and an adjudication approach that takes account of the national context and values when relying on international law system, may further mitigate these concerns.​[123]​ Courts may also develop rules that reduce, in appropriate circumstances, the direct application of international law. Exclusionary rules on standing, the public/private character of the treaty in question, and the directness and precision with which the language of the treaty is couched can all be relevant considerations in deciding on the direct application of international law within the national legal system.​[124]​

Our conception of democracy should go beyond elections, representation or majoritarianism; ensuring the rule of law should be paramount. In some instances the judiciary may have to ‘take the lead’ by using international law to protect people or reform laws that have not yet engaged the attention of the legislature. Reliance on international law brings other perspectives to bear on decision making and could be seen as an exercise in comparative law; an exercise which courts, especially in common law countries, routinely engage in by borrowing from the jurisprudence of other national courts.​[125]​ We should, however, caution against the thinking that the use of all international law is an exercise in comparative law and hence persuasive.​[126]​ International norms that bind a country at the international level and have been implemented at the national level cannot be treated merely as persuasive.

At the national level, we may query the authority, in the absence of a constitutional or legislative mandate, of judges to rely on international norms such as international judicial decisions to which the relevant country had no role to play in their creation, and unincorporated treaties.​[127]​ The increasing use of international law by the judiciary, threatens to offset the balance of power between the executive and the legislature as regards law making. Whilst these concerns are legitimate, it should be borne in mind that decisions of international tribunals are relatively few and only serve as persuasive authority. Unfortunately, the African decisions noted above did not clearly articulate the basis upon which they used unincorporated treaties. However, the idea that a government could assume an obligation at the international level but remain free to breach it at the national level seems legally unattractive, and morally reprehensible; it paints a picture of an irresponsible government. By relying on unincorporated treaties, the judiciary brings the government onto the path of responsibility. 

Elsewhere, courts have been trying to articulate the basis of relying on unincorporated treaties. In the New Zealand case of Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,​[128]​ a submission was made that since the Convention on the Right of the Child had not been incorporated into New Zealand law, it had no effect in the national legal system. To Cooke P, this argument was “unattractive” since it implied that “New Zealand’s adherence to the international instruments has been at least partly window-dressing.”​[129]​ I suggest that as an organ of government, the judiciary in Africa has a role in ensuring that governments fulfil their international obligations, and respect international law. This is especially so where the obligations assumed or laws engaged are meant to protect the individual for domestic abuse or foster and regulate commercial and other interactions among individuals transacting on the international plane.

IV CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEW JURISPRUDENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP
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